Journal of Financial Crises
Volume 4

Issue 4

2022

Argentina: Reserve Requirements, 1994–1995
Natalie Leonard
Yale School of Management

Follow this and additional works at: https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-financial-crises
Part of the Economic History Commons, Economic Policy Commons, Finance Commons, Finance and
Financial Management Commons, Growth and Development Commons, Policy Design, Analysis, and
Evaluation Commons, Public Administration Commons, and the Public Policy Commons

Recommended Citation
Leonard, Natalie (2022) "Argentina: Reserve Requirements, 1994–1995," Journal of Financial Crises: Vol. 4
: Iss. 4, 318-337.
Available at: https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-financial-crises/vol4/iss4/16

This Case Study is brought to you for free and open access by the Journal of Financial Crises and
EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale. For more information, please contact
journalfinancialcrises@yale.edu.

Argentina: Reserve Requirements, 1994–19951
Natalie Leonard2
Yale Program on Financial Stability Case Study
June 15, 2022: Revised December 22, 2022
Abstract
The devaluation of the Mexican peso in December 1994 sparked concerns about the quality
and safety of government debt across Latin American countries, including Argentina. In late
1994 and 1995, Banco Central de la Republica Argentina (BCRA) implemented three changes
in reserve requirement policy to restore liquidity throughout the financial system and
defend the currency peg to the US dollar. First, it lowered the existing minimum reserve
requirement, which required banks to hold reserves entirely in cash (pesos or US dollars).
This released more than ARS 4 billion (USD 4 billion) in resources into the banking system,
according to the Argentine government. Second, it imposed a “safety net” reserve
requirement in US dollars (USD) to expand liquidity to banks that needed it. Third, it replaced
the cash requirement with a Minimum Liquidity Requirement (MLR) that banks could satisfy
with a range of highly liquid assets. Some conclude that the adoption of the MLR helped to
strengthen the financial system’s resilience to volatility in the market.
Keywords: Argentina, Banco Central de la Republica Argentina, reserve requirements,
reserve ratio, liquidity rules

This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project
cases considering the adjustment of reserve requirements. Cases are available from the Journal of Financial
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2 Research Associate, YPFS, Yale School of Management.
1

318

Journal of Financial Crises

Vol. 4 Iss. 4

Overview
The Mexican peso devaluation in December
1994 spurred a broader crisis across Latin
America. Rumors about systemic risks to
Argentine wholesale banks due to their
high exposure to government bonds led
large and institutional depositors to
withdraw their deposits from those banks.
Although wholesale banks were, for the
most part, small institutions insulated from
foreign capital markets, the interbank
lending market collapsed and trading levels
fell 50% over concerns about systemic risk.
In the first quarter of 1995, total Argentine
bank deposits fell by 18% (Guidotti and
Nicolini 2016). Wholesale bank deposits
fell by about 60%.
The BCRA implemented a number of
emergency measures to respond to the
crisis. The BCRA implemented two changes
to reserve requirement policy to inject
liquidity into the financial system during
the acute phase of the crises and one
change during the recovery phase of the
crisis.

Key Terms
Purpose of Adjusting Reserve Requirement (RR): To
“inject additional liquidity” and “facilitate the
movement of funds between banks” (Reuters 1995)
Range of RR Ratio
(RRR) Peak-toTrough

Average RR for all deposits
from 21% to 14% (from the
cut of minimum cash
requirement of 43% to 30%
for demand and savings
deposits and 3% to 1% for
time deposits)

RRR Increase
Period

Not applicable

RRR Decrease
Period

Dec. 28, 1994–June 3, 1996

Legal Authority

BCRA Charter

Interest/
Remuneration on
Reserves

Not on minimum cash
requirement; yes on the MLR
(5.65% on Bank Liquidity
Certificates issued by the
Treasury, which was one
option for satisfying the MLR)

Notable Features

Three policies: minimum cash
requirement, “safety net”
requirement, minimum
liquidity requirement

First, in December 1994, the BCRA lowered
its minimum cash requirement, which was
the main reserve requirement tool
Released ARS 4 billion (USD 4
authorized by its charter, from 43% to 30% Outcomes
billion) into the banking
on demand and savings deposits and from
system
3% to 1% on time deposits (BCRA 1994).
The government said the cuts lowered the average reserve requirement on deposits from
21% at the end of December 1994, to 14% in mid-March 1995 (IMF 1995b). The minimum
cash requirement was unremunerated (Guidotti and Nicolini 2016).
Second, in January 1995, the BCRA introduced a “safety net” requirement. The BCRA funded
the safety net with an additional reserve requirement that banks deposited in the public
Bank of the Argentine Nation, which in turn extended credit to liquidity-constrained banks
(BCRA 1995a; Guidotti and Nicolini 2016). The BCRA set this requirement at 2% of a bank’s
deposit base on January 12, 1995. The requirement was lifted in June 1996 (BCRA 1996b).
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Third, in July 1995, the BCRA introduced a minimum liquidity requirement, replacing the
cash reserve requirement (BCRA 1995g). Banks could fulfill this requirement by holding a
wide range of liquid assets; it was remunerated.
Summary Evaluation
The Argentine government said that the initial cuts in reserve requirements had released
more than ARS 4 billion (USD 4 billion)3 in resources into the banking system by March 1995,
compared to ARS 1.3 billion in swaps and loans that it made to banks in the same time period
(IMF 1995b). The government said in August that capital flows had reversed, and half of the
deposits that had left the country in the first half of 1995 had returned by early that month
(IMF 1995c).
Guidotti and Nicolini (2016, 38) conclude that “the banking crisis was virulent but short lived
and its successful resolution translated into renewed public confidence in the system.” They
also conclude that “the adoption of MLR and the contingent repo line constituted a central
feature [of] the central bank’s strategy in strengthening the financial system’s resilience to
face volatility” (Guidotti and Nicolini 2016, 18).
Ganapolsky and Schmukler (1998, 30) find that lowered “reserve requirements increased
bond prices (perhaps because they provided a stimulus to the economy) and reduced the
interest rate. However, they seem to have increased the volatility of the interest rate.”

3 Argentina pegged the Argentine peso to the US dollar at a rate of 1 USD = 1 ARS and maintained this peg

until 2002.
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Key Design Decisions
1. Purpose: The BCRA lowered reserve requirements to add liquidity to the system.
BCRA President Roque Fernandez stated on January 11, 1995: “By reducing the reserve level,
we hope to inject additional liquidity. [Lowered reserve requirements] should facilitate the
movement of funds between banks” (Reuters 1995).
2. Part of a Package: The BCRA also lent to banks via its discount window and
established contingent repo lines with banks; however, Argentina’s currencyboard arrangement limited the amount of foreign exchange credit that the BCRA
could offer through these facilities, and in March 1995, the government sought
further support from the IMF and other international sources.
Argentina pegged its currency to the US dollar in 1991 under a currency-board arrangement.
This arrangement required the BCRA to fully back its monetary base with dollardenominated assets. Twenty percent of those assets could be US dollar-denominated
domestic debt, according to the BCRA charter, codified in Ley No 24.144 of 1992 (Pou 2000).
The currency board therefore constrained the BCRA’s emergency lending to no more than
20% of the monetary base. The bank very nearly exceeded that level during the crisis,
reaching 18.5% in April and May 1995 (see Figure 1). At this point, the government sought
further support from the IMF by extension of credit under the Extended Fund Facility for the
fourth year (IMF 1995d). The IMF approved the extension in April 1995 (IMF 1995a).
Figure 1: International Reserves and Bank External Liquidity (left axis, USD millions)
and Monetary Base Backing with Bonds (right axis, %)

Source: Guidotti and Nicolini 2016.

Concurrent with the implementation of a Minimum Liquidity Requirement in July 1995, the
BCRA established contingent repurchase agreement (repo) lines that large international
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banks could hold to meet the MLR (Guidotti and Nicolini 2016, 18). These interventions, as
well as others, shifted the banking system’s liquidity away from deposits at the central bank
and toward repos, liquidity bills,4 and foreign deposits (see Figure 2).
Figure 2: Banking System Liquidity (as % of total deposits)

Source: Guidotti and Nicolini 2016.

In February 1995, as the crisis deepened and the deposit run continued, the BCRA formally
revised its 1992 charter to introduce a deposit insurance scheme; however, the scheme was
funded privately, and its impact was limited at the time it was introduced. The government
also created a mechanism for resolving troubled financial institutions, backed by a USD 500
million loan from the World Bank (Guidotti and Nicolini 2016).
The BCRA substantially expanded the regulatory authority of the Superintendence of
Financial and Exchange Institutions (SEFyC). The government created two trust funds, to
privatize provincial banks and to restructure troubled private banks. An amendment to the
Financial institutions Law expanded the BCRA’s authority to restructure troubled banks,
including the power to extract nonperforming assets by creating “bad” banks (Pou 2000).
3. Legal Authority: The BCRA drew its authority from its 1992 charter, which was
later amended.
The BCRA charter authorized the board of directors of the BCRA to set reserve requirements,
subject to limitations laid out in Article 28. These limitations were: the reserve requirement
could be only constituted in cash or demand deposits held at the BCRA, or in foreign currency
held in a foreign currency account, denominated in either local or foreign currency; and
reserve requirements could not be remunerated (Congreso 1992).

According to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, liquidity bills (or leliqs) in Argentina were “offered
on a daily basis and [could] only be purchased by banking entities for their own portfolio.” BCRA issued
liquidity bills in pesos with a seven-day maturity (SEC 2019).
4

323

Argentina

Leonard

On July 14, 1995, the BCRA announced a new Minimum Liquidity Requirement, which could
be held in a range of noncash assets and was remunerated5 (BCRA 1995g). It was thought
the nonremunerated reserves and minimum cash requirements prevented sound banking
regulations. High RRs on demand and savings deposits had discouraged financial institutions
from promoting the use of checking accounts and had encouraged the use of volatile term
deposits. Therefore, MLR replaced the old RR regime to address these concerns.
In 2001, Decree 439/2001 amended Article 28, allowing the BCRA to remunerate reserves.
The decree mentions that the BCRA had circumvented the ban on remunerating reserves by
replacing the reserve requirement with a remunerated MLR (Congreso 2001). However, it
also noted that banks could only use foreign currency assets to meet the MLR. Banks could
meet reserve requirements with domestic or foreign currency assets (IMF 1995d).
4. Administration: The Board of Directors of the BCRA set reserve requirements.
The Board of Directors of the BCRA set reserve requirements, per Article 14 of the BCRA
charter (Congreso 1992).
The minimum cash requirement was to be deposited in a sight (demand deposit) account at
the BCRA or at the BCRA’s account at the Bank of the Argentine Nation’s New York Branch
(BCRA 1992a; BCRA 1991). The safety net requirement was held in the BCRA’s account at
the public Bank of the Argentine Nation (BCRA 1995a).
The BCRA used a foreign bank, the New York branch of Deutsche Bank, as the custodian of
MLR assets, to make sure MLR assets were unencumbered and to avoid back-to-back loans;6
the BCRA monitored its performance of that role (Guidotti and Nicolini 2016).
5. Governance: The BCRA reported annually on its operations to the Congress.
Pursuant to Article 10(i) of the BCRA charter, the president of the BCRA was required to
report annually on operations of the bank to the Congress, including reports on the scope of
monetary, exchange, and financial policies in execution. Article 39 of the BCRA charter
additionally established an external auditor, appointed by the board of directors, whose
report was submitted both to the board and to the Congress (Congreso 1992).
The BCRA Charter of 1992 specified that the primary mission of the BCRA was to support the
peg of the peso to the US dollar. Starting in 1991, Argentina fixed the peso through a currency

Pedro Pou (2000), governor of the BCRA, indicated in an IMF article:
[T]raditional reserve requirements have been replaced to be remunerated liquidity requirements . . .
The requirements have a decreasing rate that starts at 20 percent for liabilities less than 90 days . . .
Only 20 percent of these requirements need to be channeled through the central bank. The rest can be
invested in a wide range of very safe and liquid international assets.
6 This is an arrangement between two parties to lend each other equal amounts of money in different currencies
to hedge currency risk, similar to a currency swap.
5
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board that required the monetary base to be backed one-for-one with US dollar assets.7 The
BCRA also took up a supervisory role through the Superintendence of Financial and
Exchange Institutions (BCRA n.d.b; Congreso 1992).
6. Communication: Argentine officials said that “temporary” changes to reserve
requirements would boost liquidity.
The BCRA published circulars that communicated changes to the reserve requirement policy
(BCRA n.d.a). Officials and spokespeople consistently characterized reserve requirement
changes as “temporary” in contemporaneous statements to the press (Dow Jones 1994;
Reuters 1995).
In January 1993, Argentine Economy Minister Domingo Cavallo announced reserve
requirement changes to inject liquidity in financial markets (Reuters 1993). On December
28, 1994, BCRA President Roque Fernandez said (Reuters 1994):
It was considered necessary to relax liquidity restrictions a little, but maintaining the
fundamental spirit of Convertibility, so pesos will continue to be scarce. This frees up
about 800 million [pesos], which will allow banks to move more freely in terms of
liquidity but we are giving them liquidity in dollars and keeping the restriction on
pesos.
Both Cavallo and Fernandez emphasized that the one-for-one-peso-dollar parity should
reassure market participants that Argentina would not devalue. Their aim was to avoid
Mexico’s fate (Reuters 1995).
7. Assets Qualifying as Reserves: The minimum cash requirement could only be
satisfied with cash in foreign or local currency held at the BCRA. However, the
Dollarization Requirement and the Minimum Liquidity Requirement imposed
different asset holding requirements.
Article 28 of the BCRA charter specified that the minimum cash requirement could only be
satisfied with foreign or local currency held at the BCRA (Congreso 1992). However, the two
additional reserve requirements that the BCRA added throughout the crisis had different
holding requirements.
“Safety Net” Requirement
Effective January 16, 1995, the BCRA required that all financial institutions hold an
additional 2% of total deposits and other obligations in US dollars, to be held in the BCRA’s
account at the Bank of the Argentine Nation (BCRA 1995a).

The currency board regime lasted from April 1, 1991, until January 2, 2002. The currency board allowed the
monetary base to be partially backed by domestic-currency assets, including Argentinian government bonds.
Foreign reserves had to make up at least 66.6% of the monetary base (Spiegel 2002).
7
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Minimum Liquidity Requirement
As of August 1, 1995, the BCRA required that all financial institutions comply with the MLR
by holding repos on government bonds; OECD members’ government bonds with ratings of
A or higher; bank liquidity certificates issued by national government; or standby one-year
letters of credit with foreign financial institutions rated at least AA, up to 20 percent of MLR
(BCRA 1995g; Guidotti and Nicolini 2016; IMF 1995d).
8. Reservable Liabilities: Reserve requirements applied to checking accounts,
overnight savings accounts, and time deposits.
Reserve requirements covered checking accounts, overnight savings accounts, and time
deposits. Reserve requirements were relatively high on checking and overnight savings
accounts and much lower on time deposits. Guidotti and Nicolini found that this difference
generated an unequal distribution of liquidity in the system, noting that time deposits were
more likely to run than overnight accounts.
9. Computation: Reserve requirements were calculated using the rolling monthly
average of the deposit base.
The reserve requirements were calculated on a contemporaneous basis and applied to the
rolling monthly average of the deposit base (Montoro and Moreno 2011). The BCRA
indicated in December 1993 that pesos deposited in excess of the minimum cash
requirement were automatically converted into US dollars using the purchasing exchange
rate, though it is unclear whether this applied in 1995 as well (BCRA 1993b).
10. Eligible Institutions: The Financial Entities Law defines that commercial banks,
investment banks, mortgage banks, finance companies, savings and loan
companies for housing, and credit unions are subject to the BCRA’s reserve
requirements.
Ley 21.526 of 1977 (“Financial Entities Law”) defines the powers of the BCRA to regulate
financial entities (Congreso 1977). Article 2 recognizes six categories of financial institutions
that are regulated by the BCRA and the SEFyC: commercial banks, investment banks,
mortgage banks, finance companies, savings and loan companies for housing, and credit
unions. Article 31 specifies that these entities must meet the cash reserve requirements
established by the BCRA (Congreso 1977).
Generally, circulars updating reserve requirements did not disaggregate reserve
requirements by type of financial institution but rather by account type (e.g., BCRA 1994).
However, a December 29, 1992, circular, which created a reserve requirement for current
accounts in US dollars, specified that banking entities transacting in foreign currency were
subject to the additional reserve requirement (BCRA 1992a). A circular from August 1988
enumerates these banking entities (BCRA 1988).

326

Journal of Financial Crises

Vol. 4 Iss. 4

11. Timing: The BCRA lowered and revised reserve requirements to expand available
liquidity following the devaluation of the Mexican peso in December 1994.
The Mexican peso devalued sharply in December 1994, triggering a run on deposits of
wholesale banks in Argentina in the first three months of 1995. We focus on three measures
that the BCRA took in response:
•

On December 28, 1994, the BCRA lowered the minimum cash requirement from
43% to 30% on demand and savings deposits and from 3% to 1% on time deposits
(IMF 1995d).

•

On January 12, 1995, the BCRA added an additional requirement that 2% of all
deposits be held in US dollars at the BCRA account in the public Bank of the
Argentine Nation (BCRA 1995a). These funds were used as a “safety net” to make
lending available to wholesale banks, experiencing the worst of the run on deposits
(Guidotti and Nicolini 2016, 11).

•

In March 1995, half of cash-in-vault and resources used to purchase assets from
banks in difficulty were both included in satisfying RR.

•

On July 14, 1995 the BCRA replaced reserve requirements with a Minimum Liquidity
Requirement (BCRA 1995g). The MLR could be satisfied with a broader range of
assets (Guidotti and Nicolini 2016).

12. Changes in Reserve Requirements: The BCRA implemented three distinct reserve
requirements and lowered reserve requirements throughout 1995.
The BCRA implemented three types of reserve requirements between 1994 and 1996. Each
is discussed below. See Figure 3 for a full list of assets and timeline of changes.
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Figure 3: Timeline of Reserve Requirement Changes
CIRCULAR

DATE

RESERVE REQUIREMENT CHANGE

Jan. 12, 1992

Minimum cash requirement for US dollar accounts of 71% (held in US
dollars in BCRA sight [demand] accounts)

A2026

Dec. 29, 1992

Increase minimum cash requirement for US dollars checking accounts
from 30% to 60% by March 1993

A2042

Aug. 16, 1993

Minimum cash requirement:
• Current, sight, term: 43%
• 30-59-day obligations: 3%
• Deposits in savings banks (foreign): 43%
• Current accounts in US dollars: 43%

A2132

Dec. 28, 1994

Temporary reduction of the minimum cash requirement:
• Current accounts: 30%
• Sight deposits: 35%
• 30-59-day obligations: 1%
• Current accounts in US dollars: 30%

A2293

Jan. 12, 1995

Full dollarization/convertibility as of January 12, 1995

A2298

NUMBER

Expiration of transitory reduction on February 28, 1995
Establishes additional 2% “safety net” requirement in US dollars
Jan. 26, 1995

Encourages entities that have difficulties meeting the requirement to
present their case to SEFyC

A2304

Jan. 31, 1995

Minimum cash requirement
• Current accounts: 32%
• Sight deposits: 32%
• 30-59-day obligations: 1%
• Current accounts in US dollars: 32%

A2307

Feb. 28, 1995

Minimum cash requirement
• Current account: 33%
• Sight deposits: 33%
• 30-59-day obligations: 2%
• Current accounts in US dollars: 33%

A2315

Mar. 10, 1995

Exclude from calculation base (minimum cash): advances and rediscounts of the central bank; loans granted by Bank of the Argentine
Nation

A2317

Apr. 27, 1995

Extended A2317 through May 31, 1995

A2331
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RESERVE REQUIREMENT CHANGE

CIRCULAR
NUMBER

Jul. 14, 1995

Minimum Liquidity Requirement introduced:
• Current, savings, demand accounts (pesos and USD): 0%
• Obligations up to 59 days: 6%
• Obligations 60-179 days: 2%
• Current accounts in US dollars: 30%
MLR held in: repo operations, OECD government bonds with A rating
or higher, securities with significant listings on foreign markets
Minimum cash requirement:
• Current accounts (pesos and USD): 30%
• Savings accounts (pesos): 30%
• Sight deposits, term deposits: 30%
Savings (foreign currency): 30%

A2350

Mar. 21, 1996

Minimum Liquidity Requirement:

A2422

•
•
•
•
•
•

Checking accounts (pesos and USD): 15%
Savings accounts (pesos and foreign): 15%
Time deposits (foreign) up to 89 days: 15%
Time deposits (foreign) 89-179 days: 10%
Time deposits (foreign) 180-365 days: 5%
Time deposits (foreign) over 365 days: 0%

MLR held in: repo operations, OECD government bonds with A rating
or higher, securities with significant listings on foreign markets, bank
liquidity bills with national government, domestic public and private
securities with A rating or higher, home equity loans, and mortgage
loans with put option to foreign bank, OECD company bonds with A
rating or higher
Jun. 3, 1996

Repeal “safety net” reserve requirement, increase Minimum Liquidity
Requirement by 1%

A2444

Sources: BCRA 1991; BCRA 1992a; BCRA 1992b; BCRA 1993a; BCRA 1994; BCRA 1995a; BCRA 1995b; BCRA 1995g;
BCRA 1996a; BCRA 1996b; BCRA 1995c; BCRA 1995d; BCRA 1995e; BCRA 1995f.

Minimum Cash Requirement
The minimum cash requirement was the standard reserve requirement, consistent with
Article 28 of the BCRA charter (Congreso 1992). The minimum cash requirement
distinguished between types of accounts. Before the crisis, current (savings) and sight
(demand) accounts were subject to a 43% requirement, while transferable and
nontransferable fixed-term obligations faced requirements between 3% (for 30-59-day
terms) and 0% (for terms greater than 60 days) (BCRA 1993a). To meet the requirement,
financial institutions deposited either pesos or US dollars at the BCRA’s account at the Bank
of the Argentine Nation’s New York Branch (BCRA 1991).

329

Argentina

Leonard

The minimum cash requirement applied contemporaneously (that is, without lagging) and
applied to the rolling monthly average of the day-end deposit base (BCRA 1995g; Montoro
and Moreno 2011). The minimum cash requirement was not remunerated (Congreso 1992).
On December 28, 1994, the BCRA announced a temporary reduction in the minimum cash
requirement to 30%. On January 12, 1995, the BCRA indicated that the reduction would
expire on February 28, 1995 (BCRA 1994; BCRA 1995a). As of July 14, 1995, the minimum
cash requirement was permanently lowered to 30% (BCRA 1995g). See Figure 3 for a full
timeline of changes to the minimum cash requirement.
On January 12, 1995, the BCRA announced that the minimum cash requirement had to be
held in US dollars (BCRA 1995a). Ganapolsky and Schmukler (1998) find that this mandatory
dollarization of reserves had a positive impact by restoring confidence in the currency board.
On March 10, 1995, the BCRA announced that it would exclude advances and rediscounts of
the central bank and loans granted by the Bank of the Argentine Nation from the deposit base
for purposes of the minimum cash requirement calculation (BCRA 1995e).
“Safety Net” Requirement
On January 12, 1995, the BCRA announced an additional requirement of 2% of the entire
deposit base in both pesos and foreign currency to be held in US dollars. The additional net
requirement came into effect on January 16, 1995, and was to be held in the BCRA’s account
at the Bank of the Argentine Nation (BCRA 1995a). If a financial institution was found
deficient in this additional reserve requirement, it faced a 48% nominal annual charge on
the total deficiency (BCRA 1992b). Financial institutions that could not meet the
requirement had to meet with the SEFyC (BCRA 1995b).
According to Guidotti and Nicolini, the additional “safety net” reserve requirement was
implemented for all banks to make “lending available to the banks that required liquidity
assistance through the interbank market” (Guidotti and Nicolini 2016, 11). This was likely
because the run on deposits was especially sharp for smaller, wholesale banks (See Figure
4). By increasing the reserve requirements, the BCRA was able to provide liquidity to these
wholesale banks.
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Figure 4: Evolution of Deposits

Source: Guidotti and Nicolini 2016.

Minimum Liquidity Requirement
On July 14, 1995, the BCRA announced that it would implement a new MLR, starting in
September 1995 (IMF 1995d). This liquidity requirement could be met by holding a range of
liquid assets, initially including: repo operations with the BCRA, OECD government bonds
with A rating or higher, and securities with significant listings on foreign markets.
The maintenance period for the MLR was comparable to the minimum cash requirement:
calculated on a continual basis using the monthly average of the deposit base (BCRA 1995h).
The MLR was initially set at 0% for current, savings, and demand accounts, and 2% to 6%
for term obligations of up to 180 days. The requirement was held at Deutsche Bank’s New
York Branch in an account monitored by the BCRA (BCRA 1995g). The MLR was
remunerated (Congreso 2001); see “Changes in Interest/Remuneration on Reserves.”
On March 21, 1996, the BCRA increased the MLR substantially but also expanded the types
of assets that could qualify for the requirement (BCRA 1996a).
13. Changes in Interest/Remuneration: The cash requirement was not remunerated;
the new MLR was remunerated.
Statutorily, the BCRA could not remunerate the cash reserve requirement (Congreso 1992).
On July 14, 1995, the BCRA announced a new Minimum Liquidity Requirement, which could
be held in a range of noncash assets and was remunerated (BCRA 1995g). The MLR could be
satisfied through the purchase of bank liquidity certificates issued by the Treasury, which
then paid 5.65% interest, and the proceeds of these certificates were placed in international
reserves of the BCRA. Banks also could place part of the liquidity requirements in a special
account abroad or in the form of reverse repurchase agreements with the BCRA. The
Congress found that the nonremunerated reserves and minimum cash requirements
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prevented sound banking regulations (Congreso 2001). High RRs on demand and savings
deposits had discouraged financial institutions from promoting the use of checking accounts
and had encouraged the use of volatile term deposits. Therefore, the MLR replaced the old
RR regime to address these concerns.
In 2001, Decree 439/2001 amended Article 28, allowing the BCRA to remunerate reserves.
The decree mentioned that the BCRA had circumvented the ban on remunerating reserves
by replacing the reserve requirement with a remunerated MLR. However, it also noted that
banks could only use foreign currency assets to meet the MLR. Banks could meet reserve
requirements with domestic or foreign currency assets (IMF 1995d).
14. Other Restrictions: Entities that could not meet the requirement were subject to
charges for noncompliance and could present their case to the Superintendence
of Financial and Exchange Institutions for individual adjudication.
The BCRA set charges for noncompliance with the reserve requirement regime, as a
percentage of reserve deficiencies. These penalties were frequently changed, through
circulars.
Financial institutions that could not meet the reserve requirement were required to present
their situations to the Superintendence of Financial and Exchange Institutions (BCRA
1995b).
15. Impact on Monetary Policy Transmission: There is no evidence of sterilization of
liquidity released through RR adjustments.
There is no evidence that the authorities sterilized any amount of liquidity released through
the adjustment of RR.
16. Duration: The RR adjustment in the minimum cash requirement was temporary,
and the BCRA communicated the end date of that change.
On December 28, 1994, the BCRA implemented a temporary reduction of the minimum cash
requirement (BCRA 1994). In the first circular, the BCRA did not list a specific end date; on
January 12, 1995, a circular specified that the reduction would expire on February 28, 1995
(BCRA 1995a).
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